Following the troubles, traumas and tragedies of the previous decade; The Premier League was born in 1992. Premier League teams broke away from the football league and signed a massive TV satellite deal worth 2.6 billion; the figure would only be shared between all teams. Similarly to the ITV deals of 1985 and 1988, the top clubs again would be at an advantage. Primarily, The purpose of the Premier League breakaway was simply to make more money for the big clubs, and their owners.[1] Therefore it’s unsurprising why so many supporters suffered a crisis of identity with their football club during this period. The foundation of the Premier League meant for the first time in football’s history the relationship between clubs and their supporters was unregulated. Already noted is the commercialism of the 1980s however during the Premier League era any working class affiliation was abandoned by a game firmly in favour of a wider and more profitable market. Anthony King furthers this emphasis by arguing: ‘The Premier League was not simply the political economic framework which facilitated the new consumption of football but it was itself part of this new consumption of football, articulating new identities and social relations’.[2] This chapter will directly analyse how footballing identities and relations changed during this period.
Premier League Clubs thoroughly exploited the new demands made by Lord Justice Taylor’s report of 1990. Whilst it would have been impossible to predict the vast commercialism of football post-Hillsborough, ‘Lord Justice Taylor’s reluctance to slam the brakes on rising ticket prices was an oversight that has only grown more acute since 1990’.[3] Since the report, one-third of professional clubs in England have built new grounds. The report ultimately forced all-seater stadia and therefore the clubs cannot take responsibility for the notion. Rather, it was the manner by which the clubs designed their arenas which bore significance. All grounds were built with a commercial perspective to allow space for boxes, suites and hospitality. The widening fashionable form of entertainment was so prominent it resulted in a backlash from ex Man United captain Roy Keane. Following a poor result at Old Trafford at the beginning of the millennium, Keane referred to corporates at the game as the ‘Prawn Sandwich Brigade’. Therefore it can be argued that the Taylor Report’s ‘seating arrangements increased ticket prices to subtly exclude working class fans… seating was designed to attract a more disciplined and respectable family audience’ (Brebber: Gibbons: 53). Whilst the report did ultimately finalise the exclusion of the working class, it would be impossible to predict the boundless commercialism that would follow.
Within his report, Lord Justice Taylor acknowledged that a large section of the supporters were from the working class. Therefore he argued that the rebuilding process didn’t necessarily have to increase ticket prices: ‘It should be possible to plan a price structure which suits the cheapest seats to the pockets of those presently paying to stand’ (Taylor). The reality became very different as ticket prices at Anfield and Old Trafford have risen by 1000% during the Premier League era. ‘The new stadia improved media and public perceptions of the game’ (King: 107). As a result TV coverage would reach unprecedented levels in the Premier League period. Post-1992 deals would blow the ITV contracts of the 1980s out the water. The latest Premier League deal with Sky and BT sports is £5.14 billion for the right to screen live matches between 2015 and 2018 (BBC). The Rise of Premier League TV income has rocketed from 191 million in the 1992 deal to the current agreement of £5.136 billion. This works out at a cost of over £10 million a game.
Noted in the introduction to this case study was the initial resistance to TV in football. Burnley Chairman Bob Lord had warned of the impending threat and the proposed TV deal was abandoned. However, from the outset of the Premier League in 1992, the link between TV and football has been embraced by the media and football clubs alike. An article from the Daily Mirror in 1992 highlights the shift in attitudes towards commercialism in football. The two-page spread details the new BSkyB deal and argues that ‘The Sky’s the Limit’ for football. Harry Harris describes the deal as: ‘The biggest revolution in TV soccer’. Football shows would now be on Sky every day and for the first time ever football matches would be played on Monday nights. The article details interview with Ken Bates, Chelsea’s Chairman and Wimbledon’s Chairman Sam Hammam. Unsurprisingly, Tottenham chairman and satellite company owner Alan Sugar was also in favour of the deal. All the owners display a positive attitude to the new deal. Hammam states that ‘the prime reason why this is a good deal is because it helps supporters… as a result of the deal the price of tickets should not go up. I can say certainly say they won’t increase at Wimbledon’. This turned out to be wholly inaccurate, Wimbledon themselves would relocated to Milton Keynes and form a new franchise named ‘MK Dons’. In addition, ticket prices would increase by an average of 300% from 1992-2002 (Conn). Sky’s domination of football was again down to key decisions and relationships in the 1980s. The TV Company’s owner Rupert Murdoch was close friends with Margaret Thatcher and the Prime Minister granted Murdoch a satellite license to reduce the power of the print work unions.
Somewhat ironically the strong sense of identity, locality and passion of football and its supporters was one of the first triggers for Premier League overseas investment: ‘The powerful bonds between football clubs and their working class communities facilitated the internationalisation of the Premiership. This process has led to many clubs being bought by foreign owners thus removing them even further from local communities’ (bainbridge). Intent to cash in on the globalisation and commercialism of Premier League football, clubs have been bought by business stretching all over the globe. Wolves’ sale in July 2016 to a Chinese business now means 27 English Clubs are owned by overseas groups. The result means the owners share little interest and identity with the traditional and working class following of their clubs. Instead their focus is primarily financial and to globalize their club as a brand.
Man United captain Roy Keane again provided criticism of overseas involvement in the game: ‘English football is changing and not for the good… It’s not the game we knew… Owners are coming in from other countries and I don’t know if they understand the game of football, it’s an ego thing, like a toy they play with. They buy clubs, sack managers’. Blackburn Rovers embody Keane’s description. Run by the Chicken Meat Company Venky’s since 2010, the club has faced fans’ protests ever since. Within that time, the owners have sacked seven managers and have racked up a club debt of over £100 million. As detailed in the introduction to this paper, Blackburn’s working class roots are firmly tied with football. However, now supporters feel as if they have lost their football club. Following a protest in October of last year, Rovers fan and founding member of the BRFC Action Group told the Lancashire Telegraph:
‘My family are all supporters and I was born into this club. To see it how it is now, I am heartbroken. We have a ground that holds 34,000 and we get 7,500. We have got owners who have not been here for two years, they do not care. The supporters are the lifeblood of the club. Without them the club does not matter’.
The article itself detailed a protest where supporters arrived to the match on the 18th minute and left on the 75th minute. 1875 marked the year Blackburn Rovers were formed and the protest performed by over 2,000 served to remind their club of their historical roots. Blackburn’s story is one all too common in the modern era. Huge debt, asset stripping and false promises are now commonplace in English football. The most well-known example is Portsmouth tumbling into England’s bottom tier and entering administration following a series of failed ownerships and a debt of £120 million.
However overseas owners aren’t alone in alienating their traditional section of working class support, domestic owners specifically in Northern England have thrown their clubs into financial jeopardy. Bolton Wanderers, once an established Premier League side now play in the country’s third division. Wanderers narrowly avoided administration under British businessman Edwin Davies in January 2016. A similar picture is apparent on the north-west coast with Blackpool. A Premier League side at the beginning of the decade, the club now find themselves struggling in England’s bottom tier. The supporters firmly place their blame upon Chairman Karl Oyston. A lack of investment in facilities, players and staff since their relegation combined with Oyston’s pursuit of libel claims against his own supporters have made him a deeply unpopular figure. In an interview with Ian Ridley, Oyston makes it clear he has no real interest in football: ‘I was not a fan at all. I had been to a handful of matches… I had no interest in the football’ (Ridley: 27). Oyston is not alone; the vast majority, if not all current football owners are first and foremost businessmen and not football men. Therefore they sometimes unknowingly display a lack of appreciation for football’s heritage and instead are focused on making money. Of course, when football was owned by local businessmen, there was a stronger connection and consideration between clubs and supporters.
Another key component of the Premier League is the dramatic rise in players’ wages. Whilst it was acknowledged in the previous chapter that the wage relaxation occurred in the 1960s, the wage has now reached astronomical levels. Last summer Man United broke the world transfer record by paying £89 million for Paul Pogba, the midfielder reportedly receives a wage of £290,000 per week. Pogba’s pay packet isn’t an anomaly with the most Premier League players receiving on average £44,000 per week. Research by Deloitte estimated that Pogba now earns 736 times more than the average Man United fan. Therefore the financial divisions between players and fans have unquestionably heightened the decline of a relationship between working class communities and football.
Additionally, the media’s coverage of football and specifically footballers has furthered the cult of the ‘celebrity footballer’, ‘Local heroes have been replaced by international celebrities’ (Crompton: 5). Once footballers were sources of a relatable admiration, this attitude has been replaced by one of inaccessible obsession. Prior to his arrival in Manchester last summer, the Daily Mail reported Pogba partying with music star Drake in New York. The article lavishly describes the United’s midfielder’s attire and lifestyle. It is therefore no surprise working class supporters feel detached when the media catapult stars into such a flashy, exclusive and extravagant walk of life. The coverage can also be negative. In November 2016, the Daily Star remarked that ‘football playboy’ Raheem Sterling had angered teammates after arriving to training in a new Bentley. The article clearly condones Sterling’s excessive display of wealth. However, just two months later the same paper reported Sterling having lunch at Greggs in Knutsford, Manchester. Joe Hinton’s article entitled ‘£44m bargain-loving Raheem Sterling’s taste for Greggs’ clearly paradoxically refutes its earlier publication but also highlights the outlandish present day fascination towards top-level footballers. Even the most, basic day to day activities of footballers is marketed in a disengaging manner which leads to a lack of identification between supporter and player.
One possible explanation for the extraordinary new wave of media reportage is the restriction and limitations for football journalists. In the past, reporters were banned for publishing false articles, now a ban can be issued by clubs if the article does not paint the club in a good light. The action defies the whole purpose of journalism and it is the fans that lose out. Following coverage of a fans’ protest against his ownership, Mike Ashley, Newcastle Chairman banned three local reporters. The football supporters federation remarked that the sanction was ‘worrying’ and that “An objective and independent press is vital, and is often the only way that fans can find out the truth about what’s going on at their clubs”. Football news is traditionally embedded in the news districts of the local working class community. However, in the Premier League era, reports have been supressed and diverted to the clubs’ official website, which is usually nothing more than a ‘packaged corporate PR exercise’ (Rawlinson). In his book ‘How Twenty Years of the Premier League Have Changed Football Forever’, Ian Ridley describes Man United as a ‘Kremlin’ due to Sir Alex Ferguson’s decision to ban BBC journalists. He complains that ‘access and information is limited… being a football writer in England these past two decades has often meant being a Kremlinologist… psychiatrist, economist…’ thus emphasising the challenge of keeping supporters in the loop. In keeping with the main hypothesis, the break-down of relationships between the media and clubs was first visible in the 1980s. The inaccessibility led to a new style of reportage which focused on the celebrity footballer, particularly the likes of George Best and Paul Gascoigne. The coverage would intensify as both players battled with alcohol and depression during and following their football careers. As a result of the new style of reportage combined with the cult of the celebrity footballer: ‘casual socialising between footballers and journalists disappeared towards the end of the 1980s. There was a breakdown in trust’ (Holt).
[1] Conn, David. 2017. “The New Commercialism”. In A Game Of Two Halves? The Business of Football, 1st ed. Chapter 2. London.
[2] King, Anthony. 1995. “THE PREMIER LEAGUE AND TILE NEW CONSUMPTION. OF FOOTBALL”. Social Research 1 (3).
[3] Tempany, Adrian. 2016.
Jack Langford 